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RESOLVING THE EUROZONE CRISIS—
WITHOUT DEBT BUYOUTS, NATIONAL
GUARANTEES, MUTUAL INSURANCE,
OR FISCAL TRANSFERS 
 
1. Overview
One of the reasons for the failure of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin) and the
European Council to resolve the eurozone crisis is resistance to debt buyouts, national guarantees,
mutual insurance, and fiscal transfers between member-states. This paper argues that none of
these are necessary, either to convert a share of national bonds to European Union (EU) bonds,
or for net issues of eurobonds. In so arguing, it draws on an earlier report recommending Union
bonds to European Commission President Jacques Delors, which he then included in his White
Paper of December 1993.1
1.  In funding the New Deal, the Roosevelt administration did not buy out the debt of the
American Union’s “member-states,” nor did it require them to guarantee US Treasury bonds
or demand fiscal transfers from them.
2.  The United States funds its Treasury bonds from federal taxes, whereas Europe does not have
a common fiscal policy. But member-states can finance the share of their national bonds con-
verted to Union bonds without fiscal transfers.Policy Note, 2011/5 2
3.  The European Investment Bank (EIB) has issued its own
bonds for 50 years without national guarantees or fiscal
transfers and is already twice as large as the World Bank.
The  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  is  the  nominal
guardian of stability, but the EIB can safeguard growth.
4.  Conversion of a share of national debt to Union bonds
could be made on the basis of an enhanced cooperation
agreement whereby some member-states could retain their
own bonds.2
5.  Jean-Claude  Juncker  and  Giulio  Tremonti  are  right  in
arguing  that  sovereign  Union  bonds  should  be  globally
traded, would attract global surpluses, and could enable
the euro to become a global reserve currency.3
6.  But a share of converted national bonds could be held by
the Union on its own account, rather than traded. This
would ring-fence the converted bonds from rating agencies
and enable governments to govern, rather than the agencies.
While some member-states are deep in debt, the EU itself has
next to none. Until May 2010 and the beginning of national
debt buyouts, it had none at all. Even with such buyouts and sal-
vage operations for banks, EU debt is still less than 2 percent of
GDP. This is less than a fifth of the US debt-to-GDP ratio in the
1930s, when the Roosevelt administration began to shift savings
into investment through the expansion of US Treasury bonds.4
2. Stabilization by Untraded Union Bonds
European finance ministers have been considering a variant on
the Brussels-based Bruegel Institute’s proposal for EU bonds,
but  the  proposal  has  major  shortcomings  that  are  eliciting
opposition, especially from Germany:
1.  The proposal assumes that the debt would be traded.
2.  It also assumes that the bonds would need a new institution.
3.  It  proposes  making  member-states  jointly  and  severally
liable for the bonds.
4.  It also calls for a standardized collective action clause that
could include fiscal transfers.
5.  The proposal would need approval by all national parlia-
ments rather than joint action by member-states through
the European Council.
However,  as  former  heads  of  government  such  as  Giuliano
Amato,  Guy Verhofstadt,  Michel  Rocard,  Mario  Soares,  and
others have suggested,5 such conditions for debt stabilization
are not needed. The reasons are as follows:
1.  National  debt  converted  to  Union  bonds  need  not  be
traded. If held and managed by the EU in a debit account,
such bonds would be ring-fenced against downgrading by
rating agencies.
2.  As bonds of different maturities reached term they would
not need to be repaid, while a sustainable interest rate for
their renewal could be determined by the Eurogroup of
eurozone finance ministers, rather than rating agencies.
3.  Member-states’ share of the converted debt would be serv-
iced by them from their national tax revenues, without the
need for a common fiscal policy or national guarantees,
and without fiscal transfers from other member-states.
4.  Joint and several liability for the bonds and a standardized
collective action clause would therefore not be needed.
5.  The transferred debt would not need a new institution but
could  be  held  by  the  ECB  or  the  European  Financial
Stability Facility.
6.  The conversion of national debt of up to the Maastricht
limit of 60 percent of GDP could be on an enhanced coop-
eration basis—as was the creation of the euro—without
obliging all member-states to adopt it. Germany, Austria,
the Netherlands, and Finland could keep their own bonds
without liability for the converted debt.
3. Recovery by Tradable Eurobonds
Net issues of eurobonds could be traded and would attract sur-
pluses from the central banks of emerging economies and sov-
ereign wealth funds.
The Initial Design Role for the European Investment Fund
The European Investment Fund (EIF) was designed to issue the
Union bonds recommended in 1993 in the Delors White Paper.
Its role was to use them to finance a European Venture Capital
Fund.6Germany and France were opposed to Union bonds, and
as a result, the EIF’s originally intended role for such a fund was
downgraded to that of provider of ineffectual loan guarantees
for small and medium enterprises (SMEs).
Recovering the EIF Role as Part of the EIB Group
The EIF has been brought into the EIB Group, which should
strengthen its role as net issuer of bonds to finance growth. The
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its  long-standing  credibility  with  markets  in  issuing  bonds
without debt buyouts, guarantees, insurance schemes, or fiscal
transfers. A decision on net eurobond issues could be made by
Ecofin, which is the governing body of the EIB Group.
Cofinancing EIB Projects
The traded eurobonds could cofund EIB project finance and be
serviced by revenues from EIB projects, rather than fiscal trans-
fers between member-states. Project control would be retained
by the EIB. They could also finance a European Venture Capital
Fund for SMEs, reinforcing the EIF’s remit to support SMEs
and  the  competitiveness  of  smaller  firms  in  the  European
periphery, including new high-tech startups.
Cohesion and Convergence 
Since the launch of the Amsterdam Special Action Programme
in 1997, the EIB has been given both cohesion and convergence
remits by the European Council to invest in health, education,
urban renewal, green technology, SMEs, and high-tech startups,
building on the 1994 Council decision that the EIB should fund
trans-European transport and communications networks. In
just 14 years, the EIB has quadrupled its annual investment
finance to the equivalent of two-thirds of the Commission’s
own resources. By quadrupling its investment yet again by 2020,
aided  by  cofinance  from  eurobonds,  the  EIB’s  bond-funded
investment finance would be the equivalent of Marshall Aid,
and could make a reality of the European Economic Recovery
Programme (EERP). 
4. Global Implications
If some eurozone member-states default, and the single cur-
rency serially disintegrates, there would be catastrophic conse-
quences not only for Europe, but also for the United States and
the global trading system.
Offsetting Default Risk
By contrast, net issues of eurobonds would:
1.  Secure the euro as a reserve currency and contribute to the
more plural global reserve system, which is one of the main
aims of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.
2.  Contribute to balanced global growth, which is a central
aim of the G20, by recycling global surpluses.
Implications for the United States
The implications for the United States of the euro attaining
global reserve currency status are two-sided: 
1.  The dollar would no longer have the advantage of being the
sole reserve currency.
2.  Inversely, it would not be subject to the risk that it could
not sustain this role.
Net gains for the United States would depend on net issues of
eurobonds to finance the EERP rather than debt stabilization
alone. With such a recovery, and with Europe making up a third
of the global economy, US exports would increase. In its own
interest, yet also to mutual advantage, China could agree to an
orderly reduction of its holdings of dollars, or maintain them
while its net surplus flows into eurobonds.
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